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The Fifteenth Day of the Fourth Month of the Year of the Male 
Earth Tiger, corresponding to 10th June 1998, will probably 
stay as a milestone date in Bhutan's modern history. HM 
Jigme Singye Wangchuck, the fourth King of Bhutan, known 
to his subjects as the Druk Gyalpo, has issued a kasho (royal 
edict) that could bring profound changes in the kingdom’s 
everyday life. By devolving full executive powers to an elected 
cabinet, the authority of which will be defined by the National 
Assembly during its 1999 session, and introducing the 
principle of his own political responsibility, the King has 
opened a new page in Himalayan politics. 
Although being a small country which has always been very 
cautious on the international scene, Bhutan, as a buffer 
state, nested in the heart of the Himalayas, between India 
and China, has a strategic position in a region where the 
divisive forces of communalism are vivid. The kingdom, which 
has long stayed out of the influence of such forces, is now 
facing potential difficulties with the aftermath of the so called 
ngolop1 issue and the impact of ULFA-Bodo activity across 
the border with India, that threatens its political stability and 
internal security. The process of change in Bhutan is not 
meant to fit in any regional model that could be inspired by 
Indian or Nepalese politics. However there is a clear 
interaction between national and regional politics. Whatever 
happens on the internal political scene, can have 
repercussions outside the kingdom, and vice-versa2. As a 
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genuine Buddhist kingdom, which has chosen a unique path 
towards development, Bhutan, while preserving its cultural 
heritage, has to meet new and specific challenges that relate 
not only to social and economic factors, but also to a broader 
approach of development that includes political changes. In 
order to understand the rationale and the impact of the 
current reform, we must place it in its historical, economic, 
social and cultural context. 
 
  The process of change 
 
Even if many Bhutanese, including civil servants and 
members of the National Assembly have been most stricken 
by the suddenness and the amplitude of the changes 
introduced by the King3, the reform must not come as a 
surprise to close observers of Bhutan's modern history. On 
the contrary, it can be considered as a new and logical step in 
an ambitious program of guided political, economic and 
administrative change, which was initiated by the former 
Druk Gyalpo back in the mid- 1950s. It should also be noted 
that contrary to most countries where monarchy is 
assimilated to immobility, the Bhutanese monarchy has 
always been the leading force of change. The history of 
modernisation in Bhutan can be broadly divided into two 
phases that correspond to the rule of the last two kings, 
including the present one. 
 
The third Druk Gyalpo, HM Jigme Dorji Wangchuck, (1952-
1972) was the architect of modern Bhutan4. His rule has 
been dedicated to reform and restructuring of the existing 
political and economic system to allow the kingdom, in a 
world that was changing rapidly outside, to adapt to new 
challenges. As far as institutions were concerned, he 
separated the judiciary from the executive by establishing a 
High Court and re-organised the judicial system on modern 
lines. After creating the Tshogdu (National Assembly) in 1953, 
he progressively increased its role and powers. In 1965, the 
King also established the Lodoi Tshogde (Royal Advisory 
Council) and in 1968, he created what became the first 
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council of ministers in Bhutan. Major social and economic 
reforms were also introduced by the third Druk Gyalpo. After 
abolishing serfdom and promoting a land reform in 1952, HM 
Jigme Dorji Wangchuck developed a mass education system 
that became one of the key element of further development 
process. This system has been able to generate a highly 
educated and qualified bureaucracy that forms the core of the 
modern ruling elite. Thanks to the financial support of India, 
Bhutan also managed to organise a very efficient planning 
system that allowed the country to meet ambitious objectives. 
Under the first Five-Year Plan (1961-66) priority was given to 
the creation of basic infrastructural facilities like roads, 
power, communication system, transports, agriculture and 
animal husbandry. The second Five-Year Plan (1966-71) was 
the occasion of further development in agriculture and 
education but also in national health. 
 
The fourth Druk Gyalpo, HM Jigme Singye Wangchuck, since 
his accession to the throne in 1972, has followed the same 
path left by the former king. During the past twenty seven 
years, the Bhutanese economy has undergone dramatic 
structural changes evinced by the export of electricity, one of 
the most significant natural resources of the country. The 
monetized sector has grown rapidly. Social indicators have 
improved significantly. The expansion of basic health services 
and primary health care throughout the kingdom has had a 
major impact on the overall health and well-being of the 
population. Life expectancy has risen from 37 years in 1960 
to 66 years in 1994. Achievements in education have also 
been impressive, with more than 80% of primary age children 
in school. At the same time, Bhutan has adopted a cautious 
but constructive policy of participation in international affairs 
and socio-economic co-operation with the outside world. 
Eventually, one of the most significant systemic reform 
introduced under the present king has been the 
decentralisation of administration initiated in 1981 through 
the establishment of 20 District Development Committees 
(Dzongkhag Yargye Tshochung or DYT) followed by further 
decentralisation to the block (Gewog) level in 1991 with the 
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introduction of 202 Block Development Committees (Gewog 
Yargye Tshogchung or GYT). The King has been keen in 
strengthening these local institutions that enhanced the 
capacity of traditional local fora by developing people’s 
participation in the socio-economic decision process. 
 
In formulating national goals and policies not only on the 
basis of socio-economic progress but also by taking in 
account less quantifiable factors like emotional and spiritual 
well-being of the people, the King, who has proposed to 
promote the concept of Gross National Happiness (GNH) 
instead of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), has made an 
explicit commitment to preserve Bhutan’s cultural heritage 
and natural environment. Although this choice has given 
Bhutan a unique opportunity to view modern advancement in 
the context of genuine sustainable human development 
rather than just income growth, the kingdom has not escaped 
from patterns that usually come with development. Spread of 
education on modern lines, foreign travel, influence of 
western behaviours, improved communications, modernised 
economy have transformed Bhutan’s social structure. At this 
point of its modernisation process, the kingdom is ready to 
embark into further political reforms. 
 
Political consciousness has always been very low among the 
general Bhutanese populace. The politicisation process that 
had significant impact on large sections of Indian and 
Nepalese population, had not mobilised Bhutanese crowds, 
except for Nepali Bhutanese in the southern districts. This 
situation has been the result of various factors. Bhutan’s 
ability to insulate itself over many decades from the influence 
of social and political forces that dominated South Asia, has 
been decisive. Also determinant has been the low level of 
education of the average population which priorities clearly 
stand out of the political sphere. The existence of a ruling 
elite, largely unchallenged by adverse forces, and willing to 
keep the initiative leadership as far as modernisation is 
concerned, has prevented the emergence of organised 
factional politics. Eventually, consensus politics, which is one 
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of the major characteristics of Bhutanese traditional society, 
have provided little scope for popular participation in the 
decision making process, apart from organised 
decentralisation5. 
 
While the modernisation process is going on in the socio-
economic sphere, all these traditional factors are becoming 
less relevant, even if they still keep some importance. As 
already stated, Bhutan, once the most isolated country in the 
world, has decided, in the early 1960s to open to the worldi. 
Although it only made cautious and calculated moves to 
enlarge its approach to the international scene, the growth of 
diplomacy has already affected Bhutan’s social and political 
life. Today, the kingdom maintains diplomatic relations with 
18 countries and has 6 missions abroad. It has joined more 
than 150 international organisations, including the United 
Nations6. Only India and Bangladesh have embassies in 
Thimphu, but more than 50 international agencies are 
involved in development projects in Bhutan. Such evolution 
had many repercussions both on the government itself and 
on the population. 
 
As far as the government (the monarchy and the 
bureaucracy) is concerned, ideological influence coming from 
abroad is an interesting subject to consider. One should first 
notice that global political concepts like socialism or 
liberalism are totally irrelevant to Bhutanese politics. The fact 
that Bhutan is in contact with these concepts through new 
channels of communication like embassies and programmes 
of co-operation, has not changed anything. Political 
behaviours in the kingdom have always been difficult to 
relate to pre-determined patterns. Because the Buddhist 
theocratic tradition prevailing before the establishment of 
monarchy, provided little ideological support to the new 
regime other than religious principles, there has been no 
apparent dominant political ideology in modern Bhutan. This 
does not mean however that ideological considerations 
cannot be used to describe new political behaviours. The 
monarchy, under the leadership of the present King has 
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developed a very articulated policy based on decentralisation 
and protection of national identity. In some respect, this 
policy has been theorised through the concept of Gross 
National Happiness which proclaimed objectives are the 
preservation of cultural heritage and natural environment, 
the development of human resources, and the nation’s 
financial self sufficiency. This policy is inspired by traditional 
principles like conciliation, pragmatism and compassion. The 
welfare of the public is a modern version of Buddhist 
doctrine’s (fundamental need for harmony in human 
relations)ii. If not ideological in a western sense, such 
approach is providing a coherent political basis to the regime, 
which is rather new to Bhutan7. 
 
Although there is a certain degree of incompatibility between 
the western derived rhetoric relating to politicisation and 
Bhutanese practice, since the former may be irrelevant to the 
latter, we can assume that the development of a (look-like) 
nationalist ideology in Bhutan is the first step of a broader 
politicisation process which will have influence in all sectors 
of the society. Such a process will probably generate its pros 
and cons. Education has already introduced major changes, 
particularly among young Bhutanese who are absorbed into 
both the national system and the international mainstream. 
While the ancient elite had been socialised under traditional 
cultural principles, a growing number of young Bhutanese 
are educated abroad. The impact among young generations of 
western influence8, even minor, could be a challenge to the 
national ideology that needs to be addressed on the political 
level. The creation of opposition political parties in exile, even 
limited to an ethnic context, has also to be addressed. The 
introduction of a new government system is the occasion to 
encourage and prepare the people, especially youngsters, to 
participate in the decision making process in order to enlarge 
the base of government. 
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The content of the reform 
     
The Bhutanese monarchy has always been very flexible in its 
attitude towards political structures. Pragmatism and a 
predilection for gradualism seem to be the main 
characteristics of its approach. In this respect, the current 
reform is coherent with previous changes that have occurred 
in the kingdom since the early 1960s. It not only represents a 
significant step in the process of adapting political structures 
to new challenges, but it also strengthens some aspects of 
tradition by refusing to comply with any international 
standard. We could discuss at length about the Bhutanese 
regime’s nature. Most observers will be tempted to describe 
the current reform as a move from an absolute monarchy 
towards a constitutional monarchy. Both attributes, when 
used to describe monarchical systems in the West, have 
specific meanings. None of them however seems to 
correspond to the Bhutanese system which is best described 
as a "Buddhist monarchy", assuming that such a category, if 
not totally consistent in terms of western constitutional 
criteria, is borrowing from many different models including 
democracy. As presented in the King’s kasho, the 
constitutional reform adopted by the National Assembly 
during its last session is three-fold. 
 
Structure and designation of the Lhengye Zhungtshog 
(Cabinet)9  
 
Two different aspects of the reform must be considered under 
this heading. The first one is new to Bhutan, while the 
second is more traditional in its content. From now on, 
Bhutanese ministers (lyonpos) will not be appointed by the 
King. They will be voted in by the National Assembly. An 
executive body called Lhengye Zhungtshog (Cabinet) will 
henceforth comprise of elected ministers (Co-ordination 
Committee) and the members of the Royal Advisory Council 
(Lodoi Tshogde) who are themselves elected or designated 
under specific rules10. 
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The idea of electing ministers came as a surprise to most 
Bhutanese who are not familiar with such a concept 11. 
Before the reform, ministers were appointed by the King who 
had the discretion to remove them at any time. The National 
Assembly had the capacity to approve their appointment by a 
simple majority vote on the recommendation of the King, and 
to force the resignation of any of them by a two-thirds vote of 
no-confidence. These powers however were largely theoretical. 
The Tshogdu has never challenged the King’s choice, neither 
has it forced a minister to resign. Although answerable to the 
National Assembly, ministers were mainly responsible to the 
King himself. 
 
The National Assembly endorsed the reform proposed by the 
King only after vigorous deliberation among the members. 
Considering that an election process could result in 
partiality, vested interests, corruption and divisive politics,  
most of them defended the status quo. A consensus was 
eventually reached assuming that the King would keep some 
of his former prerogatives. Under the new system, the Druk 
Gyalpo has first to short-list12 and to nominate the 
candidates for the Co-ordination Committee of the Council of 
Ministers, along with their portfolios, before the election. 
Candidates have to be selected from among persons who have 
held senior government posts at the rank of secretary to the 
Royal Government or above. It is then up to the National 
Assembly members to elect or reject the nominees by casting 
their votes through secret ballot. According to the King’s 
kasho: "Cabinet ministers should serve for a term of five 
years after which they should face a vote of confidence in the 
Tshogdu Chhenmo "iii. 
 
Following the endorsement of the King’s proposition, the 
members of the National Assembly elected six cabinet 
ministers nominated by the Druk Gyalpo13. All of them 
secured a large majority of the votes cast. Votes against the 
nominees ranged between 4 and 20 members of the Assembly 
among a total of 140. If not significant in terms of opposition 
to the King’s choice, such result gives credibility to the overall 
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procedure. In the future, in the event a nominee would 
happen to fail to secure a majority of the votes cast, the King 
will have to propose a new candidate. Although not realistic 
in the present context, such an evolution could be a decisive 
step in the politicisation process of the National Assembly. As 
stated by many members of the Tshogdu during its 76th 
session: "power and responsibility go hand in hand". Giving 
to the National Assembly the power to elect ministers, even 
on a pre-selected short list base, will introduce a larger sense 
of political responsibility among its members. For that 
reason, the current reform must be seen as a follow up to the 
process of modernisation of the Assembly already initiated 
many years ago by the former King. The Tshogdu, which has 
emerged as a key player in the Bhutanese political system, is 
largely conservative. Being directly involved in the 
designation process of the Council of Ministers will not 
change its attitude towards fundamental political issues. 
However, it could force it to adopt a new perspective. 
Considering that the Tshogdu, in the future, will be probably 
more involved in national politics, not only as a traditional 
forum of discussion but more and more as a western type 
Parliament, the election of cabinet ministers could be a 
prelude to further reforms within the National Assembly 
itself. 
 
As far as the structure of the Cabinet is concerned, the 
reviving of a large horizontal executive body is a clear sign of 
cultural tradition prevalence in Bhutanese politics. It is also a 
way to introduce checks and balances within the executive 
branch itself. 
 
Two different structures would have been possible for the 
new Cabinet. One is the proposed form of the Lhengye 
Zhungtshog with the members of the Royal Advisory Council 
(Lodoi Tshogde) in it. The other would have been a smaller 
and somewhat more cohesive committee consisting only of 
ministers, with the Lodoi Tshogde staying a consultative 
body, separated from the Cabinet. Bhutan has already 
experienced both structures. The Lhungye Shungtshog then 
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translated as "State Committee"iv created after the 
establishment of the first council of ministers in 1968, 
consisted of the ministers, the Lodoi Tshogde members and 
the speaker of the Tshogdu14. Although not formally 
abolished, this body ceased to meet when a co-ordination 
committee consisting primarily of ministers and high ranking 
officers with executive responsibilities, was created in 1975v. 
This tendency was confirmed with the development of central 
administrative structures and the extension of ministers’ 
authority. A cabinet consisting only of ministers under the 
leadership of the King, has progressively become the core of 
the executive branch. In the chart presented in September 
1996 in the Eight Five-Year main document, the Lodoi 
Tshogde is not mentioned as a part of the executive branch, 
but as an advisory body distinct from the Cabinet which is 
assimilated to the Council of Ministersvi. 
 
Such a small structure with elected members would have 
been very close to a western type cabinet, but the inclusion of 
the Lodoi Tshogde in a larger body can be seen as a typical 
Bhutanese structure. Although the Lodoi Tshogde was 
formally introduced in the mid 1960s as an advisory body to 
the King, its history can be traced back to the State Council 
(Lhungye Tsok) that was created in 1651 by the first 
Shabdrung15. The principle of tripartite participation involving 
representatives of the people, the administration, and the 
monk body, which is prevalent in all Bhutanese traditional 
political bodies, is a balance to the bureaucratic structure of 
the committee of elected ministers. Having in the same body 
high ranking civil servants who made all their careers in the 
administration, former chimis (elected members of the 
National Assembly) who also had responsibilities at the 
village and the block levels, businessmen and monks, is a 
good way to give opportunity to various channels of influence, 
representing the diversity of the society, to participate in the 
decision making process. 
 
Bhutan: Political Reform in a Buddhist Monarchy 
 124
Devolution of executive powers of governance to the 
Council of Ministers 
 
The kasho and the minutes of the Assembly do not provide 
clear evidence about which of the two executive bodies (the 
Co-ordination-Committee or the Lhengye Zhungtshog) will 
formally be vested with full executive powers. According to 
the Kasho's wording16, devolution is apparently proposed in 
favour of the Co-ordination Committee (elected ministers 
alone) and not in favour of the Lhengye Zhungtshog (Cabinet) 
as a global body. Assuming that there was an initial 
confusion about the exact meaning of the terms (Cabinet), 
and (Council of Ministers), this interpretation is not 
conclusive. Moreover, if Lodoi Tshogde members are 
supposed to fully participate in the executive function, as it is 
implied by the translation of Lhengye Zhungtshog by the term 
of (Cabinet), such an interpretation is in contradiction with 
the fact that decisions adopted by the Lhengye Zhungtshog 
will be based on consensus. In that case the whole Lhengye 
Zhungtshog (Cabinet) should be vested of executive powers. 
Although acceptable in theory, this solution is difficult to 
implement. It could result into criticism equivalent to those 
that led to the replacement of the old State Committee, back 
in the early 1970s, by a smaller body. Such a structure could 
complicate the functioning of governance in some respect. 
Confusing the division of powers and responsibilities between 
a consultative body (the Lodoi Tshogde) and an executive 
body (the Co-ordination Committee) could cause some 
problems. On the contrary, if powers of governance are 
devolved only on the elected ministers, the conduct of 
executive functions would be easier. 
 
Discussing this issue is interesting in terms of constitutional 
law. However, such a debate is rather academic. The powers 
and functioning of the Lhengye Zhungtshog have still to be 
defined. The kasho provides that ( a decision should be taken 
on the role and responsibilities of the Lhengye Zhungtshog). A 
constitutional committee comprising of 36 members17 
representing the people of the 20 Dzongkhags, the clergy and 
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the government, has been charged by the King to prepare a 
chathrim (rules and regulations) that will be presented for 
enactment by the National Assembly during its 77th session 
in the summer of 1999. One of its major tasks is to define the 
role and the responsibility of the Lhengye Zhungtshog. 
 
The solution will be probably to present the Lhengye 
Zhungtshog as a global executive committee, like the former 
State Committee used to be, but in a rather more modern 
form. Since the adoption of the reform in July 1998, the 
Lhengye Zhungtshog has only met a few times, on once a 
month basis, while the Co-ordination Committee meets every 
Tuesday. It seems that while the latter would be in charge of 
everyday governance, the former would deal with more global 
and systemic issues like economic and social reforms 
recommended or approved by the National Assembly, or 
proposed by the Co-ordination Committee. Security and 
sovereignty matters would also be discussed within the 
Lhengye Zhungtshog18. Reviving such a structure is coherent 
with Bhutanese tradition. Establishing a cabinet, larger than 
the committee of elected ministers itself can prevent some of 
the potentially disruptive consequences of the election of 
ministers, to destabilise the executive branch. Implicating 
more directly the members of the Lodoi Tshogde in the 
governance activity is an interesting idea. However, a clear 
balance will have to be defined within the Lhengye 
Zhungtshog itself, between consultative deliberations and 
formal executive decisions. Considering that the Bhutanese 
system does not follow western institutional lines, we can 
assume that the chathrim, while defining some general 
principles, will not give all the answers as far as rules and 
regulations of the Lhengye Zhungtshog are concerned. 
Bhutanese politics have always been functioning along 
informal lines. Tradition and practice will have to fill in the 
blanks left by constitutional texts. As far as devolution of 
executive powers is concerned, a compromise solution could 
be to consider that such powers formally belong to the 
Lhengye Zhungtshog that delegates its competence to the Co-
ordination Committee. 
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Whatever be the final articulation between elected ministers 
and Lodoi Tshogde members, the devolution of full executive 
powers of governance by the King is a very significant change 
in Bhutanese politics. Since the establishment of the 
monarchy in 1907, the King, who has been both Head of 
State and Head of Government, had been vested with all the 
executive powers. He has also shared with the National 
Assembly the legislative power. According to the Thrimzhang 
Chhenmo (Supreme Law) that was enacted in 1957, the King’s 
kashos (edicts) and kadyons (ordinances) are even above the 
law enacted by the Tshogdu. 
 
  How large will be the devolution of powers has still to be 
seen. The King’s reply to the conservative arguments 
presented during the Tshogdu’s deliberation about the reform 
is in favour of a large devolution. Although many chimis 
pleaded for the King to keep the chairmanship of the Cabinet, 
the Druk Gyalpo insisted on renouncing his function of Head 
of Government. Neither he accepted to appoint a member of 
the royal family as the chairman of the Lhengye Zhungtshog 
as suggested by some members of the Assembly19. Henceforth 
it has been decided that the chairmanship of the Lhengye 
Zhungtshog will be assumed by elected ministers on a one 
year term rotational basis20. Without any experience in prime 
ministership or any approaching form of government21, 
Bhutan will have to go through a transitional period. As 
reported by Kuenselvii, new cabinet ministers, during the 
ceremony of devolution of executive powers, submitted to the 
King that they could seek his guidance from time to time. 
Although the Druk Gyalpo made clear that he had "no 
intention to indirectly control the functions of the Lhengye 
Zhungtshog and that members of the Cabinet must instead 
work closely together to strengthen the efficiency of the 
government and provide good governance to the country", it 
is clear that the Council of Ministers will have to adjust to a 
rather new situation22. As stated by a Bhutanese popular 
saying frequently used by members of the National Assembly 
referring to this situation, "chickens do not go without a 
mother hen". Cabinet members, even unwillingly, will have to 
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learn to emancipate from the King’s guidance. It might be a 
rather long process. This does not mean that the King will 
loose all kind of influence over the Cabinet. As stated by the 
new chairman of the Council of Ministers: "while His Majesty 
would not be present in person at the meetings of the 
Lhengye Zhungtshog, the Cabinet members would continue to 
be guided by His Majesty in spirit and would depend on his 
moral support in dealing with issues beyond their 
understanding"viii. Such a statement is not pure rhetoric. 
Assuming that "the command of the King is heavier than the 
mountain and more precious than gold"23, the devolution of 
executive powers to the Cabinet will not change by itself the 
way Bhutanese, including Cabinet members, consider the 
Druk Gyalpo. While the King had not necessarily to refer to a 
political ideology because his legitimacy was not in question, 
the Lhengye Zhungtshog will certainly have to justify its 
fidelity to the monarchy, in order to strengthen its authority  
vis-à-vis the National Assembly. It is clear that new cabinet 
members who pledged their allegiance to the Tsa-Wa-Sum 
(the King, the Country, the People) and to the Bhutanese 
system will keep the King’s action as a permanent reference.  
  While the Cabinet shall be vested with full executive powers, 
the Kasho provides that "it must also keep the Druk Gyalpo 
fully informed on all matters that concern the security and 
sovereignty of the kingdom"ix. As the Head of State, the King 
has a high and natural responsibility as far as national 
security and sovereignty are concerned. The Royal Bhutan 
Army has always been administrated directly by the King 
through the Chief Operations Officer and not from the 
Cabinet24. The current reform is not meant to change 
anything in that situation. The Druk Gyalpo has claimed the 
full responsibility of solving national issues like the 
ULFA/Bodo problem25. While the Cabinet will obviously share 
some of this burden, the King’s authority allows him to keep 
the leadership on security matters. Whatever be the outcome 
of possible changes on the Bhutanese political scene, the 
King is supposed to be above vested interests that could 
result from the emergence of political factions based upon 
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ideological, ethnic, regional, familial or any economic or social 
factor. The fact that the King is primarily responsible for 
security and sovereignty matters will enhance the monarchy's 
legitimacy. 
  Introduction of a vote of confidence in the King 
As part of the reform, the Druk Gyalpo has also proposed to 
introduce a mechanism for the National Assembly to register 
a vote of confidence in the King. Although most unusual in a 
monarchy, such a proposition is not new to Bhutan. It had 
been already introduced in 1969 on the initiative of the third 
Druk Gyalpo. Under this provision, the king had to abdicate 
in favour of the next successor in the hereditary line, if two-
thirds of the National Assembly’s members supported a vote 
of no-confidence26. Although this procedure, which was only 
used once in 1969 on the insistence of the King himself, was 
slightly modified in 1970, it was eventually abolished in 1973 
by the Tshogdu. This reform was clearly too radical in its 
concept for the National Assembly to accept as a normal rule 
of procedure. Considering that similar causes produce 
identical consequences, a parallel can be drawn between the 
1969 vote of confidence and the current reform. While the 
precise content of the latter has still to be defined as far as 
rules of procedure are concerned, the former was introduced 
with similar objectives. The present King’s kasho aims to 
"further enhance and strengthen a system of government" 
that would" be best suited for the needs and requirements of 
a small nation like Bhutan to ensure its continued well-being 
and security, and safeguard its status as a sovereign, 
independent country". The former King, during the 1968 
session of the Tshogdu had expressed similar concerns. His 
desire was "to form a government combining the monarchical 
and democratic systems in order to ensure the stability and 
solidarity of the country"x. Assuming that Bhutan’s 
"sovereignty may be endangered by the fact that the kingdom 
was placed between two powerful and big countries", he also 
considered that the time had come to "think of forming a 
stable government for maintaining the peace and tranquillity 
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of the country in the future". The idea of reviving a vote of 
confidence in the king is not meant to abolish the system of 
hereditary monarchy or to weaken in any manner the role 
and the influence of the Druk Gyalpo. On the contrary, it can 
be seen as a contribution to the legitimisation process of the 
Bhutanese monarchy which is very young compared to the 
Thai or the Nepalese monarchies of which the origins are 
deep rooted in the political and religious history of their 
respective country. "Legitimisation under any political system 
is not achieved so much by the capacity to gain power as it is 
by the ability to maintain and regularise the use of power 
over an extended period of time and to have the system 
broadly accepted"xi. The capacity and the right of the Druk 
Gyalpo to rule are not questioned for the time being. However 
accepting such hypothesis for him and his successors is a 
guaranty of stability not only for the regime but also for the 
country itself. It is a concrete answer to those who could 
doubt inside and outside the kingdom of the King’s 
determination to adapt the government structures to 
changing realities. Because the historical legitimacy of the 
Bhutanese monarchy is rather recent compared to other 
monarchies in the world27, the kings of Bhutan have to be 
judged primarily upon their performance record. Such record 
largely depends on their ability to master reforms. 
The reviving of a vote of confidence in the Druk Gyalpo can be 
seen as a symbol. It is an implicit reference to the genja (oath 
of allegiance) that was adopted in 1907 by the most 
important civil and monastic officials together with people’s 
representatives, who pledged their support to Ugyen 
Wangchuck and proclaimed him as the first King of Bhutan. 
While some members of the National Assembly considered 
the introduction of a vote of confidence as an infringement of 
the spirit of the founding fathers, it can be sustained on the 
contrary that such a reform represents an opportunity given 
to the National Assembly to re-endorse the nation’s pledge to 
the King as long as his rule is not questioned. Assuming that 
hereditary kingship was inaugurated on an "electoral basis"28, 
the current reform enhances the contractual link existing 
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between the King and the people. It is also consistent with 
Buddhist traditionxii were kings are often referred to, as "ruler 
by convention"29. 
  The perspectives of further change 
In the long term the possible influence of the reform on 
Bhutanese politics must be analysed from three different 
perspectives: the executive branch (the King, the Cabinet, 
and the administration); the National Assembly and the 
people itself. 
As far as the executive branch is concerned, the current 
reform is not expected to have any influence on the status of 
monarchy itself which will stay, at least in a foreseeable 
future, the centre of Butanese politics. As the primary 
domestic agent of modernisation, the monarchy will certainly 
benefit from the reform. Should political parties emerge in the 
future as possible consequences of the current politicisation 
process, the King who has chosen not to be involved anymore 
in everyday politics, would still be considered as the symbol 
of national unity. Such role would be particularly important 
should Bhutan be put under the pressure of the divisive 
forces of regionalism and communalism. Since the 
appearance of the 'southern problem', the Druk Gyalpo has 
resisted conservative circles which advocated radical 
solutions. The current reform will probably contribute to 
enhance his image as a mitigating factor, advocating for a 
policy of reconciliation among all Bhutanese factions. Should 
national consensus happen to be challenged by further 
political changes, the King would be in good position to stay 
the last recourse as far as national unity and stability are 
concerned. Such position can be compared to the current 
status of monarchy in Thailand30. 
The reform will probably have some impact on the king’s 
personal image. Immediate changes have already occurred at 
the protocol level. While adjustment has still to be done, the 
current evolution will enhance the King’s sacred dimension. 
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Although the monarch will probably stay as accessible to the 
people as he used to be in the past, the reform could create a 
new distance between the Palace and outer circles. While the 
King is supposed, as Head of State, to continue to receive the 
credential letters from incoming ambassadors, the Palace has 
to draft new rules as far as other foreign visitors are 
concerned31. According to the new political setting, the 
appearances of the monarch on the local scene, are also 
expected to differ slightly from the past. Until last year, the 
King used to attend the sessions of the National Assembly 
and to participate on debates. According to the spirit of the 
reform, his appearance could be limited in the future to the 
opening ceremony and to specific debates when security and 
sovereignty issues are discussed. This evolution has still to 
be seen during the next summer session. The program and 
the activity of the King will also adapt to new realities. While 
he will probably keep touring the country in order to stay in 
contact with the people, some,  within the government, wish 
he takes some time to travel abroad in order to make Bhutan 
more widely known32. 
As far as the government itself is concerned, the 
consequences of the current reform will largely depend, as 
already mentioned, on the balance between elected ministers 
and other members of the Lhengye Zhungtshog, but also on 
the ability of the Cabinet to master its new responsibilities. 
With the King out of the everyday decision process, at least 
theoretically, the question of governance must be asked in 
terms of leadership and content. 
As far as leadership is concerned, Bhutan seems to have 
solved this rather delicate problem encountered in most 
regimes, by deciding that consensus will apply to the 
decisions of the Cabinet and that the presidency of the 
Council of Ministers will be attributed on a rotational basis. 
Such mechanisms are supposed to prevent factionalism and 
personal interest among Cabinet members to take the lead on 
good governance. Without the King’s arbitration however, 
ministers will have to forge their own stature not only vis-à-
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vis their colleagues within the government but also vis-à-vis 
the National Assembly. This process is a natural consequence 
of full executive power devolution and political responsibility. 
While the King was able to impose consensus as a normal 
procedure of governance under the old system, Cabinet 
members will have to resist external forces coming from the 
Tshogdu and other circles of the society that will tend to 
introduce divisive lines within the government itself. Such a 
process known as lobbying is a by-product of democracy. 
Although ideal in their objectives and functioning, consensus 
politics are very difficult to implement, especially in a rapidly 
changing society, unless a mediator is able to incarnate 
consensus or at least to convince others to approve his own 
choices. While the King will indirectly keep this function for 
some time, new mediators will necessarily have to emerge 
within the government itself. Such process, that can only take 
place in the long term, will probably draw the lines of future 
Bhutanese politics. 
The process will necessarily lead to a more politicised form of 
Government. While the members of the Lodoi Tshogde, who 
have to go through a very competitive election process at the 
gewog and the district levels, can be considered as politicians 
according to local standards, Cabinet ministers have been 
mainly bureaucrats. Things will have to change in future as 
the government becomes more and more independent from 
the King. On the long term, elected ministers will probably 
become politicians in a western sense. We cannot even 
exclude the emergence of "opinion leaders". For the time 
being, such leaders are not expected to come from outside the 
administration33. In the long term, solutions will have to be 
found to allow civil society representatives who might be 
interested in joining the government, to have access to the 
Co-ordination Committee. Although the present kasho limits 
the access to the committee to senior civil servants, 
adaptation of that rule will probably have to be considered as 
the influence of the private sector grows and the politicisation 
of the society increases. As noticed by the king himself while 
"Bhutan has many qualified and capable officials, most of 
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them are still very young and do not have enough seniority in 
keeping with (Bhutan’s) tradition and culture, to stand as 
candidates for the post of cabinet minister". No doubt that 
the current reform will create some sort of competition within 
the administration, that will also generate an emulation 
outside the civil service. Competition as such is not 
necessarily a bad thing. One of the problems of the 
Bhutanese administration during the last years had been the 
lack of mobility at the senior posts level. Former cabinet 
ministers had held their posts for very long periods of time34. 
While a reason for the civil service to be attractive to young 
Bhutanese was the opportunity it gave them to rapidly get 
high responsibilities, it was becoming, at some point of their 
career, more and more difficult to foresee any promotion. 
With the perspective of becoming, if selected by the King and 
elected by the National Assembly, members of the Cabinet, 
qualified candidates will be more motivated. High educated 
people who preferred to join the private sector because of the 
lack of responsibility posts in the administration will also be 
interested. Some of them could adopt a western style 
approach as far as candidacy is concerned. Cultivating 
friendships with National Assembly members and 
campaigning for election could become a more regular 
pattern within and outside the civil service.  
As far as the presidency of the Cabinet is concerned, we 
should not expect the emergence in Bhutan of a Prime 
Minister or a Head of Government in a western sense of 
"primus inter pares" that does not correspond to the local 
tradition of consensus. This is the reason why it has been 
decided to elect the chairman of the Lhengye Zhungtshog on a 
rational basis. Without considering his personal influence 
within the government, which can be more or less prominent 
depending on his seniority and charisma, the chairman of the 
Lhengye Zhungtshog, who also chairs the Co-ordination 
Committee, has two basic roles. One is a protocol function, 
particularly oriented towards the outside world. As the new 
Head of Government, he is entitled to meet with foreign 
dignitaries who hold similar position35 and to receive 
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representatives of foreign countries and international 
organisations who want to address Bhutan as a whole and 
not necessarily to a specific department. Although the 
tradition of this protocol function is new to Bhutan, it is also 
intended to play a role on the local scene as the chairman of 
the Lhengye Zhungtshog, who symbolises the action of the 
cabinet, will have to reach local people and explain new 
policies through meetings and visits to the districts. His 
second main role is to prepare and co-ordinate the activity of 
the Lhengye Zhungtshog and of the Co-ordination 
Committee36. 
The contents of future policies is difficult to predict. Now 
doubt that the ideas that inspired the King’s policy until now 
will stay the guiding principles of the new cabinet. In that 
respect minor changes are to be expected, at least in the 
coming years. In the long term however, the government will 
probably have to adapt to new economic realities and new 
demands coming from the society. Its capacity to translate 
these trends into coherent policies will determine the future 
of the Bhutanese regime. Its ability to find a negotiated 
solution with Nepal to the problem of refugees will also be 
decisive in terms of acceptance of its legitimacy, especially 
within foreign circles. 
 
As far as the National Assembly is concerned, the current 
reform must be seen as the first step of a global process that 
could end up in further changes. Although the Tshogdu has 
become a key element of the Bhutanese political system, it is 
more a forum of discussion and a consultative body in a 
traditional sense than a legislative body. The Tshogdu will 
necessarily have to adapt to its new responsibilities. Electing 
cabinet members who are vested of full executive power of 
governance implies that the National Assembly fully exercises 
its power of decision and control. In this respect the Tshogdu 
will have to overcome its relative political weakness. One of 
its major handicap is the gap existing between well 
experienced and highly qualified administrative officials 
capable of dealing with complicated issues and the relatively 
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modest level of political and economic consciousness of most 
chimis. Although recent sessions of the Tshogdu have 
demonstrated that its members are more and more 
concerned by national issues, including security and 
diplomacy, the interest of the chimis is more locally than 
nationally oriented. This is a rather normal situation, as the 
issues raised by them necessarily reflect concerns expressed 
by the people at the local level, both in the GYTs and the 
DYTs. However, chimis would gain authority and credibility in 
being more involved in global issues. As noted by the Home 
Ministerxiii, "in comparison to the past, the quality of chimis 
has been improving every year due to the success of the 
education system and the fact that many retired government 
servants are interested in serving their country as chimis". 
Progress still needs to be made. A better access to 
information could be promoted. Posts of parliamentary 
administrators could be created under the authority of the 
secretariat of the National Assembly. These administrators 
would be independent from the executive branch. They could 
be used as assistants and advisors to the chimis. A second 
source of weakness is the absence of "long-term programmed 
policies with a stable support base within the Assembly". As 
noted by Rosexiv, "under the Tshogdu’s electoral system, there 
is a limited continuity of membership, and only a small 
proportion of the people’s representatives in the Assembly at 
any one point in time would have a lengthy experience in 
government". Considering that the responsibilities of chimis 
have increased with regard to implementation of 
developmental programmes under the Five-Year Plan and to 
their specific role in the decentralisation process, increasing 
their term from the present three years to five years, that 
seems a reasonable duration, could motivate capable and 
educated chimis and held them to acquire enough knowledge 
about their responsibilities37. Creating specialised committees 
within the Tshogdu could also enhance its ability to play its 
role in the check and balance system of government. 
Eventually, increasing the duration of the National Assembly 
session, which is currently convened once a year for periods 
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between two weeks and one month38, could also enhance its 
leadership39. 
On the long term, the current reform can be expected to have 
some impact on the people itself. Such impact will largely 
depend on the changes already underway within the 
Bhutanese society. The politicisation process, even 
embryonic, is already taking place because of a higher level of 
education of the population. Even if they do not reveal 
fractional politics structured along either horizontal or 
vertical lines, some social groups are progressively emerging 
from the development process. Individual behaviours have 
profoundly changed during the last twenty yearsxv. This 
evolution has direct impact on collective behaviours. 
Although Bhutan is still a rural country, a new category of 
citizens, mainly involved in urban activities like industry and 
services, is taking more and more importance. While civil 
servants have become the elite of modern Bhutan, the private 
sector is a growing force of the Bhutanese society with many 
highly educated and influential people. Although the model of 
development proposed by the government is widely accepted, 
the emergence of divisive lines based on differences of opinion 
and interest cannot be excluded in the future. The opposition 
between private sector and administration, rural and urban 
society, young and old generation, modernists and 
conservatives is a usual pattern in all developing societies. 
Although multi-party system does not correspond to 
Bhutanese tradition, the day will probably come when 
political parties will have to play their role in the Bhutanese 
political system. For the time being, considering that political 
parties, even a government party, do not exist in Bhutan, 
whether or not opposition parties should be legalised is not 
on the agenda of the government. Considering the still low 
level of education and political consciousness of most people, 
the risk would be real that such parties be based only upon 
ethnic and regional factors. Such evolution could be 
disruptive of Bhutan’s polity which must keep a minimum 
consensus as far as national unity is concerned40. Instead of 
importing foreign models, the philosophy underlying the 
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reform introduced by the King seems to allow a blending of 
Bhutanese tradition with foreign concepts that are found 
adaptable and conducive for the strengthening of the 
Bhutanese system of government41. In that respect, 
decentralisation must be seen as the most significant 
contribution to the politicisation process of the society. While 
the planning commission keeps its role of co-ordinating 
planning activities, the planning ministry has been 
abolished42 in the new cabinet structure. This is both a 
symbol and a signal to local people to take more 
responsibilities through GYTs and DYTs in order to orient 
and implement local and national policies. Whether political 
parties will be structured along the lines of local politics has 
still to be seen. Should such an evolution correspond to the 
people’s need, nothing in the attitude of the King seems to be 
against it. 
There is a certain degree of uncertainty in assessing Bhutan’s 
political future, because the kingdom is located in a region 
given to potentially disruptive changes. The economic, 
political and diplomatic environment to which Bhutan must 
adjust is versatile. As a small and vulnerable society the 
kingdom has to survive by learning to cope. The reform 
introduced by the King is a pragmatic step towards that 
direction. Eventually, the National Assembly, while 
discussing the content of the awaited chathrim, could decide 
to transform it in a broader basic rule that could be the basis 
of a written constitution. 
 
Notes 
1 The word ngolop means (anti-national). It refers to people who are 
accused by the government to organize activities against the security 
and the sovereignty of the country. Such activities have been 
associated with the protestation movement that started in 1990 
when an ethnically related social disquiet erupted in the southern 
districts where ethnic Nepalese have settled. Demonstrations were 
followed by sporadic violence and terrorism activities in the border 
areas which led the government to enforce security laws. Several 
thousands people have left the kingdom, either to avoid political 
uncertainties, or because they could not meet Bhutan’s immigration 
Bhutan: Political Reform in a Buddhist Monarchy 
 138
requirements. About 100,000 are now located in refugees camps in 
south-eastern Nepal. It is unclear however how many effectively 
come from Bhutan. This movement has generated the creation of 
several political parties settled in exile. More recently, some 
individuals seem to have established relations with ULFA-Bodo 
militants whose presence in Bhutan’s border areas poses a grave 
threat to the security and the sovereignty of the kingdom. 
2One of these repercussions is the long term echo that the reform 
will have among opposition movements in exile. Some of them have 
claimed the credit of the institutional changes proposed by the King. 
3 Former cabinet members have held their posts for very long periods 
of time. Even if a reshuffling of the cabinet was predictable, because 
of the age of some ministers, the replacement of the whole cabinet 
came as a surprise to the people. 
4 In the political history of modern Bhutan "that is, post-1907, 
corresponding to the establishment of an hereditary monarchy", the 
founding father is the first Druk Gyalpo, Ugyen Wangchuck (1907-
1926). Although essential in the establishment of a strong and 
highly centralized monarchy which was a more modern form of 
government than the traditional theocratic polity, his rule was not 
consistent with the concept of modernization as we use it. 
5 Organized decentralization is rather new in Bhutan. The objective 
of the first two kings was to enhance centralization in order to 
strengthen the monarchy. 
6 Bhutan became a member of the United Nations in 1971 and 
opened a permanent mission in New-York in 1972. 
7 If not socialist as such, the welfare system is quite developed in 
Bhutan. 
8 Junk food, western music, cinema and fashion are becoming more 
and more popular among youngsters. 
9 The term Cabinet or Council of Ministers has corresponded to 
different structures in the kingdom’s modern history. Until recently, 
it was assimilated to a western type structure comprising only of 
ministers and deputy minsters selected by the King. The recent 
kasho and Kuensel articles (July 11, 1998) have proposed different 
and sometimes confusing interpretations. While the term Council of 
Ministers sometimes refers to elected ministers, the confusion is still 
present in the minutes of the 76th session of the Assembly where 
Council of Ministers and Lhengye Zhungtshog are assimilated. The 
term (Cabinet) is also proposed by Kuensel (July 11, 1998) as a 
translation of "Lhengye Zhungtshog". Although some adjustment has 
still to be found "yet, the committee consisting of the 6 elected 
ministers has not a dzongkha name" the correct interpretation is 
currently as follows: 
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 - the Lhengye Zhungtshog (15 members) can be called either 
Cabinet or Council of Ministers, while the committee consisting of 
the 6 elected ministers is referred to as ( Co-ordination Committee ) 
of the Council of Ministers. Both structures are chaired by the same 
person who is formally called chairman of the  Lhengye Zhungtshog. 
10 The Lodoi Tshogde was formally established in 1965. It is a nine-
members body consisting of a representative of the government 
(currently the former Dzongda of Trashigang who also chairs the 
Lodoi Tshogde), appointed by the King, six people’s representatives 
elected for three years by the National Assembly among canditates 
elected on the block (gewog) and district levels, and two 
representatives of the monk body. The last election of people’s 
representatives was held in July 1998. The Lodoi Tshogde works as 
an advisory body to the King and the minsters. As a watchdog of the 
overall political and administrative structure, it also safeguards the 
implementation of National Assembly resolutions and serves as a 
supervisory body of the administration. It also act as a judicial 
adviser to the King who has the power to review the decisions of the 
High Court. 
11 In 1968, the third Druk Gyalpo had already proposed that all 
appointments of ministers "be decided by the National Assembly 
which would also decide their number and portfolios" (Rose, ibid., p. 
155). The Tshogdu rejected this proposition. 
12 This short list system was used for the election of the newly 
elected cabinet, only because it was the first time the reform was 
implemented. We can assume that another system for selecting 
candidates will be introduced in the future. The Royal Civil Service 
Commission or a similar body could be associated with the selection 
process. 
13 On July 1, 1998, the National Assembly elected six Cabinet 
ministers who are as follows: Minister for Agriculture (Lyonpo 
Kinzang Dorji); Finance Minister (Lyonpo Yeshey Zimba); Home 
Minister (Lyonpo Thinley Gyamtsho); Minister for Health and 
Education (Lyonpo Sangay Ngedup); Foreign Minister (Lyonpo Jigmi 
Thinley), Minister of Trade and Industry (Lyonpo Khandu 
Wangchuk). The head of the ministry of communications is a deputy 
minister (Dasho Leki Dorji). 
14 In 1972 the two sisters of the king, who served as his 
representatives in the ministries of finance and development, were 
also members of the Lhengye Zhungtshog. 
15 Shabdrung is the term used to refer to the Founder of Bhutan, 
Ngawang Namgyel (1594-1651/1705) and to his reincarnations. 
16 The kasho provides: ( full executive powers of governance should 
be devolved to an elected Council of Ministers ). 
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17 This constitutional committee, that held its first meeting on 26 
February 1999, is chaired by the Speaker of the National Assembly. 
Its members are as follows: the vice speaker of the National 
Assembly, 20 chimis (people representatives at the National 
Assembly) elected on the base of one for each dzongkhag (district), 1 
representative of the clergy, 3 representative of the government (2 
dzongdas (district officers) and the secretary of the Royal Civil 
Service Commission – RCSC), the 9 members of the Royal Advisory 
Committee, and the Chief Justice as observer. 
18Althogh the respective role of the Lhengye Zhungtshog and of the 
Co-ordination Committee is still in debate, it is clear from current 
practice that the later is the driving force of the new government. 
The agenda of the Lhengye Zhungtshog is drafted by the Co-
ordination Committee itself. 
19 In 1975, the Co-ordination Committee was presided over by the 
King’s sister Ashi Dechen Wangmo Wangchuck. During the 76th 
session of the Tshogdu a Royal Advisory Councillor proposed that 
the chairmanship of the Lhengye Zhungtshog be handed to the 
Crown Prince, Dasho Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck. 
20 The King  formally handed over the reins of governance to the 
Lhengye Zhungtshog on July 20th 1998. The Foreign Minister, 
Lyonpo Jigmi Y. Thinley, became the first Chairman of the Lhengye 
Zhungtshog, since he won the largest number of votes (136 (for) ) 
during the ministerial elections. According to the results of the 
voting, the next chairmen of the Lhengye Zhungtshog, under the 
current 5 years term government, should be as follows: 
1999-2000: Lyonpo Sangay Ngedup (Minister of Health and 
Education) [133 votes] 
2000-2001: Lyonpo Yeshey Zimba (Minister of Finance) [132 votes] 
2001-2002: Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk (Minister of Trade and 
Industry) [127 votes] 
2002-2003: Lyonpo Kinzang Dorji (Minister of Agriculture) [126votes] 
21 The post of lyonchen, previously called gongzim, that was held by 
members of the Dorji family, from 1908 to 1965, was the closest to a 
Prime Ministership. The lyonchen however was more a councillor 
with high responsibilities equivalent to a state minister, than a Head 
of Government. 
22 One of the first act of the new Head of Government on the 
international scene was to represent Bhutan to the SAARC summit 
in Colombo. 
23 Although Bhutanese kingship is not of a sacred nature as it is for 
instance in Nepalese tradition, such a popular saying is often used 
in Bhutan where people reverence to the King is close to worship. 
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24 The situation is slightly different for the police. The police, like the 
army depends on the Chief Operations Officer of the Royal Bhutan 
Army, whose deputy is the Chief of the Royal Bhutan Police. 
However, as far as operations of maintaining law and order in the 
Dzongkhags are concerned, the police also report to the Home 
Minister. It should be noted that the Army and the Police are not 
represented in the Lhengye Zhungtshog. 
25 The ULFA/Bodo problem is described by the Chief Operations 
Officer of the Royal Bhutan Army and by the Home Minister as "the 
most serious threat to the country’s security in Bhutan’s entire 
history" (Kuensel, 25 July 1998). It is a problem not only of internal 
security, but also of political stability should Lhotshampa  militants 
seize the opportunity to join hands with the ULFA and Bodo 
militants. It might eventually affect the close friendship between 
India and Bhutan should it become a major trans-border regional 
issue. 
26Such votes had to be taken as a matter of procedure at least once 
every 3 years. Motions of non-confidence could be moved against the 
King at any time on a petition submitted by one-third of the 
membership (Rose, The Politics of Bhutan, p. 155).  
27 Technically speaking, the monarchy in Bhutan as we know it 
today, only dates back to 1907. However, Bhutanese historians 
insist on the cultural and historical continuity existing between the 
previous systems and the current monarchy. Kingdoms were 
established in Bhutan long before the country was unified during 
the 18th century. From 1751 to 1907, the druk desis, who held 
secular powers in the dual system known as chhoesi, have been 
compared to kings, although their status were slightly different.  
28 Although there is "no evidence in available sources, that anything 
resembling an election was actually used in 1907 in the events that 
preceded the recognition of Ugyen Wangchuk as Druk Gyalpo" (Rose, 
ibid, p. 147), "the decision to establish monarchy appeared to have 
been genuinely popular not only among those responsible for taking 
it but also with the public at large" (Aris, the Raven Crown, London, 
1997, p. 98). The concept of "elective basis" is used both by 
Nagendra Singh (Bhutan: a Kingdom in the Himalayas, New –Delhi, 
1972, p.96) and by Bikramat Jit Hasrat (History of Bhutan, 
Thimphu, 1980, p.123). 
29 Although HM Jigme Singye Wangchuck is not a Buddhist king in 
a religious sense, the Wangchuk dynasty has been using various 
symbols previously associated with the Shabdrung. 
30 Although the King of Thailand is not involved in everyday 
governance, he is widely considered as a national reference and has 
been able to recommend solutions to national crisis. 
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31 Readers of the weekly paper, Kuensel, can notice that the King,  
who was frequently portrayed on the front page, with local 
dignitaries or foreign visitors, has rarely appeared since the 
introduction of the reform. 
32 Apart from short visits to India and other SAARC countries, the 
King does not travel abroad. 
33 Cabinet ministers have to be elected among officials who have 
held senior government post in the Royal Government.  
34 The idea has been put forward by some members of the 
constitutional committee to limit the mandate of elected ministers to 
a single five years term. Ministers, who would like to run for a 
second term, would have to wait five years between two mandates. A 
similar rule applies on a three years basis to the members of the 
Royal Advisory Committee.  
35 For the first time since the establishment of the organization, 
Bhutan was not represented by the King during the SAARC annual 
summit held in Colombo in July 1998, but by the chairman of 
Lhengye Zhungtshog who joined the other heads of government 
attending the conference. 
36 He is assisted in this function by a government secretary. This 
post is currently held by the Foreign Secretary, Dasho Ugyen 
Tshering. 
37 This issue has been addressed by some chimis during the 76th 
session of the National Assembly. 
38 Special emergency sessions can also be convened.  
39 It should be noted however that the involvement of the chimis in 
the legislative process is not limited to their participation to the 
annual session of the National Assembly which agenda is largely 
prepared and discussed at the gewog and the district levels where 
people representatives are fully associated. 
40 As noticed by Rose (ibid.p.115): "the government of Bhutan has 
not formally banned political parties, but is well understood by the 
Bhutanese elite that the formation of such organizations at this time 
is still discouraged". For that reason political parties have always 
been created in exile. In 1952, a "Bhutan State Congress" was 
founded in Patgaon in Assam, but was rapidly discontinued. Various 
political parties and organizations have been created since the early 
1990s, in relation to the "southern problem". A "Bhutan People 
Party" (BPP) was created in Garganda in India in 1990 by militants 
from the Nepal based "People Forum for Human Rights". A "Bhutan 
Democracy Party" (BNPP) was created in 1992 by dissidents from the 
Bhutanese civil service. In 1997, the "Druk National Congress", 
created in 1994, joined other organizations to form a "United Front 
for Democracy in Bhutan" (UFD). The primary objective of these 
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organizations is the redress of the grievance of people now living in 
refugees camps in Nepal. This has been expanded to include 
demands for political reforms in Bhutan. 
41 In his kasho, the King indicates that "he has observed the political 
systems of other countries". Although importing foreign systems of 
government is not a pattern of Bhutanese politics, the third and the 
fourth Druk Gyalpo have been keen in adapting foreign concepts to 
Bhutan. It seems to be the case with the designation of the Head of 
Government on a rotational basis which is inspired from Swiss 
politics. Recently, the judiciary of Bhutan has also institutionalized 
the process of drafting laws and regulations with support from 
foreign experts provided by UNDP.  
42 The Planning Commission was created in 1971 and was initially 
chaired by the King who later on delegated this responsibility to a 
Planning Minister. 
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